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Βιογραφία συγγραφέα: Friedman Russell L.

Beckmann, Jan P.

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Serie mayor, 47 , , p. Ashworth, E. Catto et T. Evans, Oxford, Clarendon Press, , p. Brampton, C. Brown, Stephen F. Courtenay, William J. Friedman, Russell L. Maurer, Armand A. Ebooks and eBook viewers provide substantial benefits above traditional reading. Ebooks slice down on the use of paper, as advocated by environmental enthusiasts.

Presently there are no fixed timings for study. There will be no question of waiting-time for new editions. Presently there is no transportation to be able to the eBook shop. Typically the books in a eBook store can be downloaded quickly, sometimes for free, at times to get a fee. Not just that, the online variation of books are usually cheap, because publication residences save on their print in addition to paper machinery, the benefits of which are transferred to customers. Nevertheless what drove a great deal of the later-medieval trinitarian discussion was a struggle for precedence between the relation account and a rival to it: the emanation account.

In his philosophical dictionary in Book V of the Metaphysics, Aristotle presents an account of three different types of relation.

Metaphysics V, c. The three types of relation that Aristotle describes are: 1 relations founded on number and unity e. Aristotle indicated, then, that it makes no sense to talk about the relation of a father to a son without talking about the action and the passion upon which the relation itself is founded — before there can be a relation between two things, those two things have to exist, and hence, in the case of relations of the second type, the production, the action and the passion, must come first, and only then can the relation between the producer and the product arise.

That is to say, some later-medieval theologians reasoned that, just as all categorial relations of the second kind are posterior to and dependent upon the corresponding productions, so the divine relations are logically posterior to and dependent upon the divine productions.

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The translation follows that found in The Complete Works of Aristotle, ed. This view assumes, of course, that there is parallelism between God and creatures in this regard, and opponents of the view strenuously denied that that is the case, claiming that proponents confused God and creatures. See, e. The Trinity and the Aristotelian categories 17 scholastics commonly used to describe how the divine persons originate or receive their being. On the emanation account of the distinction or constitution of the persons, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are the very same divine essence in three irreducibly distinct ways, the way that each one emanates or originates.

Diagramatically, the emanation account can be set out as in Diagram B. For more on these different ways of emanating, per modum naturae and per modum voluntatis, see Chapter 2, below, especially at and around nn. Nevertheless, in contrast to the relation account, this opposition does not play the central role; the stress in the latermedieval emanation account is on the three irreducibly distinct ways in which the persons originate: unemanated, emanated by way of nature, and emanated by way of will. What is important on the emanation account, then, is that the persons are distinct because of their three different ways of holding or receiving the divine essence, these three different ways being the irreducibly distinct ways the persons emanate.

As mentioned above, Dominicans overwhelmingly held the relation account, whereas Franciscans held the emanation account. Ribaillier , esp. Books IV—VI. The Trinity and the Aristotelian categories 19 rival trinitarian traditions, a Dominican trinitarian tradition clustered around the relation account, and a Franciscan trinitarian tradition centered on the emanation account.

Intellectual Traditions at the Medieval University (2 vol. set)

This divergence of views is already clear in Bonaventure and Aquinas. I noted above that these two theologians present similar versions of the relation account of personal distinction and both appeal to the dual nature of the divine relations the fact that relation compared to its subject or foundation, the divine essence, is the same as the essence, while compared to its correlative opposite it has true distinction from that opposite.

Central, then, to both Bonaventure and Aquinas is the view that opposition of relations brings about the distinction between the persons, and both appear to think that in reality the divine properties are relations. Nevertheless, there is a systematic disagreement between the two theologians regarding the way in which we conceive the Trinity, and at issue here is whether the personal properties that bring about the distinction between the persons are best thought of as relations or as emanations.

I want to stress, however, that, as I read it, the dispute between Bonaventure and Aquinas is about the way we conceive of the personal properties 20 Medieval Trinitarian Thought from Aquinas to Ockham as emanations or as relations , not about what the properties in actuality are relations.

This particular flashpoint concerns the place of God the Father in the inner-trinitarian life. Recall that on the relation account of personal distinction, the Father is the Father because he has a Son; the Father and the Son are constituted as persons due to the opposition of relations between them, and so they are constituted as an opposed pair.

On the emanation account of personal distinction, on the other hand, the Father is constituted more on the basis of his not being from another than by his relation of paternity to the Son. Compare Diagram A with Diagram B, above.

A History of Philosophy - 27 Duns Scotus and William of Ockham

The interpretation presented here — that, when it comes to the personal properties, the difference between Bonaventure and Aquinas is on a conceptual level — is based on the following observations. First, Bonaventure presents the two accounts, relation and emanation, in close proximity to each other, so outright inconsistency seems unlikely. Second, Bonaventure claims rather consistently that emanational distinction between the persons comes about in terms of the way we understand things secundum rationem intelligendi — see, e. The Trinity and the Aristotelian categories 21 Bonaventure for the emanational view.

Let us examine the two positions. This may seem like a strange, even a useless, question, but, as I hope to show, it is in fact a question that indicates a great deal about whether a theologian holds an emanation or a relation account of personal distinction. How, then, do Bonaventure and Aquinas answer this question? Bonaventure holds that the Father is the Father because he generates.

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The focus for Bonaventure, then, is on generation as the reason that the Father is the person he is, a stress on the emanation and, I would add, on the Aristotelian category of action. Aquinas, on the other hand, argues firmly against this position. How can the Father have the personal operation of generating the Son, he asks, if the Father is not already established in being?

Et quod illud sit bene dictum patet per differentiam assignatam inter generationem et esse Patrem. Nam secundum propriam rationem generatio dicit emanationem sive originem, paternitas dicit habitudinem. Constat autem quod origo est ratio habitudinis, non habitudo ratio originis est. Et ideo generatio est ratio paternitatis, non e converso. And thus we say that in the divine there is no other source of distinction except relation. On the contrary: in terms of logical i. For Aquinas, then, the Father generates because he is the Father, and he is the Father because of the opposition of the relations paternity and filiation.

The Father and the Son are constituted in being as an opposed pair, just as the relation account of personal distinction claims. Et ideo dicimus quod nihil aliud est principium distinctionis in divinis nisi relatio. Thomas Aquinas, I Sent. Sed non est distinctum quod in divinis nisi per relationem.

Ergo intellectum operationis personalis praecedit intellectus relationis.

For Bonaventure, the Father is the Father because he generates. The type of argument Aquinas uses is countered by Bonaventure by claiming that it might seem to make sense when it comes to the Father, the actor or producer in the Father—Son relationship, but: 1d if we were to consider it in the case of the Son, it seems utterly unintelligible that because he is the Son, he is generated. For it is generally said, and reason concurs, that [1] the Son has through generation both that he is and that he is the Son.

Therefore [3] generation precedes filiation according to the way we understand things, and [since] [4] things that are relative to one another are understood as at once by nature although they do not exist [at once by nature] , therefore [7 and 8] generation is the basis of our speaking about paternity in God the Father.


For [9] just as passive generation relates to filiation, so active generation relates to paternity. To make it somewhat more transparent, before discussing it I will sketch out the argument, referring to the steps in it as numbered in italicized square brackets in the translation and filling in some of the unstated steps NB: all temporal terminology is to be understood as a type of logical ordering; God is not subject to time : 19 Bonaventure, I Sent.

Nam communiter dicitur, et ratio concordat, quod Filius et quod sit et quod Filius sit, hoc habet per generationem; ergo generatio secundum rationem intelligendi praecedit filiationem. Et relativa sunt simul natura in intelligendo, non tamen in essendo; ergo generatio est ratio dicendi paternitatem in Deo Patre. Sicut enim se habet generatio passiva ad filiationem, ita activa ad paternitatem. The Son takes his existence through passive generation premise. Filiation, the relation of the Son to the Father, can exist only when the Son exists unstated premise. Therefore passive generation must precede the relation of the Son to the Father, i.